An Extractive Industry

I remember it like it was yesterday.

30 years ago, my father — God rest his soul — dragged me to the hardware store, with the promise that yet another of my boyhood weekends would be spent “building character.”

But this weekend was different.

Instead of heading home after securing the lumber and dirt, we stopped by a Toys “R” Us.

Dad told me to look around while he spoke with a manager, and when I sauntered back to the front of the store, the manager was retrieving — ever so delicately — a Nintendo Entertainment System from a locked display case. My Dad’s outstretched hands rose to the ceiling, as if offering a prayer, ready to catch the box should the manager tumble from the ladder.

Nintendo. Humankind’s third-greatest invention (after the wheel and the Gutenberg press).

That trip to Toys “R” Us was one of the most joyful moments of my childhood. I am certain that I am not alone — Toys “R” Us was an iconic company that enriched the lives of millions of children.

And private equity destroyed it.

Let’s not mince words: leveraged buyouts (LBOs) constitute an extractive industry.

In the case of Toys “R” Us, Bain Capital, KKR, and Vornado took the company private in a $6.6B LBO in 2005. It is now bankrupt and closing all of its stores — without paying employees any severance.

In the year of the acquisition, the company generated $11.2B in annual sales, and the linked article says their biggest competitors at the time were the discount retailers Wal-Mart and Target. (Amazon’s shares were ~$35, fwiw).

Revenue was never a problem. Net sales never dipped below $11.3B (in fact they exceeded $13B between 2007-13). However, according to SEC filings, Toys “R” Us’s debt burden jumped from $1.86B at acquisition to $5.5B in the fiscal year after the deal, and annual interest expense climbed from $130m in the year of the acquisition to $400m+ beginning in 2006 (see charts). Optimizing capital structures for whom, one might ask.

ToysRUs2

The LBO firms were on the take from the get-go. According to SEC filings, “upon consummation of the Merger, [Toys “R” Us] paid the Sponsors a fee in the aggregate amount of $81 million for services rendered and out-of-pocket expenses.”

In addition, SEC filings show that between 2005-17, Toys “R” Us paid out aggregate “Sponsor management and advisory fees” of $204m. An analysis in The Atlantic suggests there may have been $128m in (incremental?) transaction fees as the company bought up KB Toys (another Bain Capital bankruptcy special) and other toy retailers.

Consider that between 2014-16, when Toys “R” Us was posting losses of $867m, $256m, and $48m, the company paid out advisory fees of $22m, $18m, and $6m. In other words, in the three years that the private equity sponsors were overseeing losses before taxes of nearly $1.2B, they still drew fees of $46m.

That giant sucking sound you hear is LBO firms hoovering out the value from a cash-generating company. One that likely could have remained a going concern, had the LBO firms not forced down such an onerous debt burden.

Again, 30,000 employees were fired without receiving severance. This is Dickensian villainy at its finest. It evokes The Ghost of Tom Joad.

The FT reports that some of KKR’s pension fund clients “are re-examining their relationship with the investment group amid anger over the treatment of workers at the bankrupt retailer.” They should.

But they shouldn’t stop there — they should re-evaluate their investments in LBOs altogether.

Here’s the dirty little secret: when pensions invest in LBO funds, they are fueling inequality.

The entire LBO model is predicated on bogging down cash-generating businesses with debt, and compelling managements’ hands to create efficiency gains (i.e., layoffs). In other words, thousands of people must lose their jobs and benefits, and be plunged into a state of precarity, in order for pensioners to remain secure in their stipends. It is absolutely zero-sum.

One of the most rigorous takedowns of the LBO model is Eileen Applebaum and Rosemary Batt’s Private at Equity Work. I highly recommend it.

Notably, one of their conclusions is that, unlike LBOs, private equity investments in small and midsize companies can drive meaningful business growth and innovation. I — and others — would argue that the opportunities for shared value creation are even greater in emerging and frontier markets.

When I came up with Portico’s ethos, I jotted down the following:

Value creation > value extraction
Build something that increases the general welfare. While there are riches to be made in value extraction, we do not believe in doing well at the expense of others. Spread dignity.

The fate of Toys “R” Us is precisely the type of BS I had in mind when I wrote those lines.

I would encourage all investors to consider the long-term consequences of the LBO model, and to eschew such extractive forms of investment.

Alla prossima,
Mike

P.S. The newsletter is taking a hiatus in August. See you in September.

Raising a Fund

At Portico, we believe in fund managers who are trying to build businesses and increase prosperity across the world.

In a sense, Portico was founded as an anti-gatekeeper. We believe that too many service providers in this industry operate in a black box, and that this lack of transparency ultimately hurts everyone.

With that in mind, we created the Informal Guide to Raising Your First Fund. Our goal with this product is to empower fund managers with the knowledge they need to develop an institutional-quality pitchbook. We’ve bundled it with a 27-page sample pitchbook to maximize its practical utility, and the feedback we’ve received tells us it’s equally relevant for managers raising funds III, IV, and beyond.

Given the exceedingly difficult fundraising environment, we’re pleased to announce that we are now offering it for only $149. It’s more important to us that a greater number of firms succeed — and that the industry develop — than that we sit on useful knowledge.

Invest in yourself. As our next story demonstrates, it’s only going to get tougher for EM managers to raise capital.

Abraaj: Redux

(For background, read parts III, and III)

This is way bigger an exposure than anyone expected … What is shocking is that the company invested almost 10 percent of its total assets and all their investment book with one company.

I am surprised that the company had more than 70 percent of its 1.5 billion-dirham investment portfolio exposed to a single fund and this was never flagged by the auditors or questioned by the shareholders.

These two quotes come from a Bloomberg article on Air Arabia’s disclosure that it faces a $336m exposure to funds managed by Abraaj.

That is a lot of granola. But it’s only part of the story.

Abraaj executed a pre-IPO investment in Air Arabia in 2007, and it secured two board seats in the process. Arif Naqvi retained his position on the board through 2017 (though he didn’t show up to the first three meetings in 2017).

Somehow, nobody seemed to see a conflict of interest in Air Arabia directing “all their investment book” to a board member’s firm?

It gets worse. The Wall Street Journal reports that, “Money originating from Air Arabia was used to replenish the [Abraaj Growth Markets Health Fund], according to people familiar with the situation. KPMG’s review of the fund didn’t mention this, one of those people said.”

KPMG, you may recall, was the firm Abraaj selected to examine the books of its healthcare fund after this whole imbroglio erupted in the press. KPMG is also the auditor of Air Arabia (among other Abraaj portfolio companies).

And then there’s the bombshell.

A separate Wall Street Journal article reveals that PricewaterhouseCoopers, a provisional liquidator for Abraaj Holdings, “have ‘been unable to obtain standalone annual financial statements or management accounts’ for the holding company, a situation they described as ‘highly irregular.’”

Absolutely extraordinary. It’s a sentence worth reading again.

According to the Journal, the PwC report goes on to say:

This lack of financial record-keeping raises the question of how the company’s directors were able to ensure the company was solvent and being effectively managed.

Investment management fees revenue had, for some years, been insufficient to meet its operating costs.

Any liquidity shortfall was largely funded through new borrowings.

Reuters reporting adds that “Abraaj’s total debt stood at $1.07 billion … including $501.4 million in unsecured debt and $572.4 million [in] secured debt.”

The launch of the $6B mega-fund may be viewed in a new light.

The whole situation stinks.

And the stink is on many hands.

Who was doing due diligence? With what documents? Where was the fund administrator?

Institutions were throwing money at Abraaj. Washington State Investment Board, for example, unanimously approved an investment of up to $250m, plus fees and expenses, in the mega-fund, “based on Abraaj’s solid overall investment performance, large, institutionalized team … [and] a consistent investment and risk underwriting process applied globally.”

During the preceding Private Markets Committee meeting, Hamilton Lane “discussed [Abraaj’s] approach to investing, reputation, culture, track record, and currency risk” and supported the staff’s recommendation to invest in the fund.

They’re not the only ones. It’s just that their minutes are public.

Consider, for example, the long list of third parties that provided Abraaj the equivalent of a Good Housekeeping Seal of approval:

  • Abraaj reportedly received its third A+ rating from the UN Principles for Responsible Investment last year.
  • Arif Naqvi was on the Board of the UN Global Compact and a Founding Commissioner of the Business and Sustainable Development Commission
  • He is also a member of “The B Team” — a self-appointed group of business leaders that seeks to advance ESG, etc. Literally the first challenge on their website is, “Drive full transparency: be open, transparent and free from corruption, with good governance and accountability at all levels of our organizations.”
  • The Harvard Business School and Kennedy School connections.
  • The World Economic Forum.
  • Gatekeepers.
  • Auditors.
  • PR firms and the press.
  • Etc.

If there is one lesson from this fiasco, it is that it pays to do your own work.

Also, don’t chase shiny objects.

Fin.

P.S. As we suggested in March, it appears that LPs in the Africa fund are looking for a new GP to manage out the assets.

Small Is Beautiful in CEE

EMPEA recently released a report on private markets in CEE and it’s really quite good. My fundamental takeaway from the report is that the region attracts little capital — between $500m and $1.5B annually between 2009-17 — but this lack of capital is why (a handful of) investors like it.

Consider that, according to the PitchBook data in the study, the median Eastern European buyout multiple between 2006-17 was 5.8x — the lowest multiple globally.

Admittedly, there were few transactions that provided data points for PitchBook, so let’s look at the other end of the spectrum: as of December 2016, EBRD’s portfolio of CEE funds — which is, like, every CEE fund ever — has delivered roughly 7.5% net across all vintages. It’s not an exceptional number, but private equity’s not about investing in an index.

Moreover, it’s not like pension funds — which aren’t pursuing EBRD’s development mandate — are doing much better. According to the American Investment Council’s 2018 Public Pension Study, the median U.S. pension fund’s private equity portfolio delivered a 10-year annualized net return of 8.6%.

Anyway, as I read the briefing, I reflected upon Portico’s thought piece from last December — Does EM PE Scale? — and decided that what’s happening in CEE is a beautiful outcome. The GPs and LPs interviewed for EMPEA’s piece seemed happy with the status quo: most investors have mistaken perceptions of the region’s risks, so they don’t invest in it; and those LPs that do invest in the region have found manager relationships they value across cycles.

Maybe EM PE is an artisanal industry.

Insomnolent in India

Bain & Co. released the 2018 edition of their India Private Equity Report. Lots of charts. Lots of things moving up and to the right.

Bain asked respondents to its survey, “What keeps you awake at night?”

The top three responses:

  • Mismatch in valuation expectations (~75% of respondents)
  • Challenges to maintain high level of returns (~55% of respondents)
  • Lack of attractive deal opportunities (~50% of respondents)

Those seem like … the core elements of running a PE business? No wonder so many Indian GPs are happy to take my calls at 2am IST — they’re not sleeping!

Funnily enough, respondents were least concerned about, “Approaching end of fund life with unliquidated assets” (~3% of respondents).

Now, Bain’s survey had 39 respondents out of a universe of active investors they estimate at 491. But I wonder, would the percentage be much different if the sample size quadrupled?

Zombie4

Turkey: Value Trap?

Last November, we asked if Turkven’s Seymur Tari was precipitating a market turn in Turkey. After seven years of declining business and consumer confidence, was the country on the cusp of a resurgence?

Well. After the latest round of elections, the president’s appointment of his son-in-law as the head of the country’s treasury and finance ministry, and changes to the rules for appointing the central bank governor, one wonders if all those assets trading at a discount might constitute a value trap.

The IMF forecasts gross external financing requirements of ~25% of GDP (equal to ~$200B) each year through 2023.

Turkey’s policymakers confront a delicate dance, indeed.

From the Bookshelf

There is a crime here that goes beyond denunciation. There is a sorrow here that weeping cannot symbolize. There is a failure here that topples all our success. The fertile earth, the straight tree rows, the sturdy trunks, and the ripe fruit. And children dying of pellagra must die because a profit cannot be taken from an orange. And coroners must fill in the certificate — died of malnutrition — because the food must rot, must be forced to rot.

The people come with nets to fish for potatoes in the river, and the guards hold them back; they come in rattling cars to get the dumped oranges, but the kerosene is sprayed. And they stand still and watch the potatoes float by, listen to the screaming pigs being killed in a ditch and covered with quick-lime, watch the mountains of oranges slop down to a putrefying ooze; and in the eyes of the people there is the failure; and in the eyes of the hungry there is a growing wrath. In the souls of the people the grapes of wrath are filling and growing heavy, growing heavy for the vintage.

— John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (Bantam Books: 1970)

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The information presented in this newsletter is for informational purposes only. Portico Advisers does not undertake to update this material and the opinions and conclusions contained herein may change without notice. Portico Advisers does not make any warranty that the information in this newsletter is error-free, omission-free, complete, accurate, or reliable. Nothing contained in this newsletter should be construed as legal, tax, securities, or investment advice.

Copyright © by Portico Advisers, LLC 2018, all rights reserved.

 

Super Sized

Earlier this month I spoke with an MD at one of the largest private markets advisory firms about the landscape of managers in EM. While discussing the consolidation of capital in fewer, larger EM funds, he raised the question of whether this dynamic is a function of greater distributions from these funds.

While the data were too close to call in The Mid-Market Squeeze (DPI of ~0.5x across fund size segments), I decided to run a fresh analysis incorporating greater granularity on fund size and vintage year. The figure below shows that EM funds >$1B (orange) are not reliably distributing cash at higher rates than smaller EM funds (shades of blue). In addition, they are generally underperforming their >$1B peers in Asia, Western Europe and the United States (shades of grey).

DPI.jpeg

All in all, I’m not convinced that distributions from larger funds are driving industry consolidation. That said, analyses based on Cambridge Associates’ benchmarks do have their limitations. A fund-by-fund analysis may very well tell a different story.

In any event, this is one of several topics I’m looking forward to discussing next month in a closed-door session with ~100 LPs at the Private Equity Research Consortium Conference. I’ll be on a panel exploring “Global Markets for Buyouts and VC” with Professor Steven Kaplan from Chicago Booth, as well as representatives from Warburg Pincus and Adams Street Partners. Here’s hoping for an interactive, no-holds-barred session.

Alla prossima,
Mike

Indonesia’s First Startup IPO

Last month’s newsletter asked the question: Who Will Make Money in EM Venture? This month, we learned that Indonesia’s first IPO by a startup was … not venture backed.

“The path that startups take is normally to look for venture capital, angel investors and so on … We feel that by taking the IPO route, that’s the method that is the most fair and transparent,” said Jasin Halim, CEO of O2O e-commerce firm Kioson. Throwing shade on VCs, he continued, “Let the market value our company.”

And so it did, at an issuance price of IDR300 / share with a book that was 10x oversubscribed. It promptly proceeded to shoot the moon.

Regulators stepped in and temporarily halted trading this Tuesday (16 Oct.) to allow for a “cooling off” period. It resumed trading on Wednesday and closed at IDR2,650 / share. #9bagger

🎉

If the valuations for startups that go public trade at a premium to those held in private hands, Indonesia may be in store for a redux of the pre-IPO craze that hit China a few years back: alchemy in the form of public-private multiple arbitrage. The China parallel is a sentiment I heard from VCs in Jakarta over the summer, and though I’m always skeptical of comparisons to China, this is a space worth watching.

SoftBank

The PwC / CB Insights Q3 data are in and SoftBank, managers of the $93 billion Unicorn Bailout Fund—sorry, Vision Fund—took the top three spots on the league table for largest deals in the United States, and the top four spots on the league table for the largest global deals (Grab, WeWork, Flipkart, Roivant Sciences). And they’re just getting warmed up!

In other news, last month SoftBank placed a $20 billion bond sale (in 7- and 10-years), with the 10s priced at 5.125%. Market participants’ comments in the FT’s write-up of the sale should be preserved for future historians so that they fully appreciate the degree to which, in 2017, all caution had been thrown to the wind:

Everyone is asking the same question: what am I investing in here? Am I investing in a company’s operations or am I providing unsecured financing to fund equity contributions to the Vision Fund?

My view is that bond investors are thoroughly unimpressed, but they’re being sucked in by the price. I find the whole structure of the Vision Fund completely perplexing, but as it’s my job to make money, we were in the [order] book.

¯\_(ツ)_/¯

(SME) Death and Taxes in India

Saurabh Mukherjea of Ambit Capital is a bit of a downer on the impacts of New Delhi’s economic reforms on India’s (relatively unproductive) small businesses:

My reckoning is that for a substantial number of SMEs, their margin was tax evasion. As the government steps up forcing people to comply with GST, a lot of small businesses that managed to stay in the shadows will find themselves sucked into the tax net. Either their profitability will be vastly diminished — or it will go away completely.

How many companies globally would lose their margin if they actually paid taxes? I wonder.

Heavy Stuff

Last month the New York Times ran a provocative piece tying Nestlé to the rise of obesity in Brazil, which they followed up with an in-depth article on KFC in Ghana [full disclosure: Mike is a shareholder of NYT]. Regardless of one’s views on who / what is culpable for the deteriorating health of Brazilians and Ghanaians, (I mean, processed foods are certainly part of the problem), the fact is that Brazil and Ghana are not exceptions: lifestyle diseases are increasing rapidly across the emerging markets.

To wit, obesity rates are skyrocketing in each EM region (see below for a sampling). In China, the number of obese adults (≥ 30% body mass index, or BMI) has compounded at 9% since 1976, growing from ~3 million to more than 80 million, while the number of overweight adults (≥ 25% BMI) grew 7x over the period to nearly 400 million. There are more overweight adult Chinese than there are people in the United States and Canada combined. Astonishingly, on a global basis, the number of obese children and teenagers has increased 10-fold over the last 40 years.

Calories

In a similar vein, the number of deaths due to diabetes is growing rapidly. While roughly 62,000 people in Europe and the United States died from diabetes in 2015, representing a 6.4% increase on the figure for 2000 (entirely driven by Americans), nearly 600,000 died across EMs, representing a 64% increase over the same period (see below).

Lifestyles

It’s not solely multinationals that are driving the ubiquity in unhealthy eating habits and processed foods. Private equity firms have been enablers of these trends, tapping into the “emerging consumer” through deals in FMCG, quick service restaurants (QSR), etc. For example, Thomson Reuters data show PE firms have invested in 61 EM QSR companies over the last decade.

That said, you can’t say PE firms aren’t also investing in potential solutions—GPs inked twice as many deals (138) in hospitals and clinics over the same period. Nevertheless, one wonders about the firms that are “investing across the lifecycle”—selling obesity-inducing foods to local populations on the front end, and lifestyle disease solutions on the back end. A fairly perverse way of creating demand where none should exist, no?

From the Bookshelf

In the West, and among some in the Indian elite, this word, corruption, had purely negative connotations; it was seen as blocking India’s modern, global ambitions. But for the poor of a country where corruption thieved a great deal of opportunity, corruption was one of the genuine opportunities that remained.

— Katherine Boo, Behind the Beautiful Forevers (Random House: 2014).

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The information presented in this newsletter is for informational purposes only. Portico Advisers does not undertake to update this material and the opinions and conclusions contained herein may change without notice. Portico Advisers does not make any warranty that the information in this newsletter is error-free, omission-free, complete, accurate, or reliable. Nothing contained in this newsletter should be construed as legal, tax, securities, or investment advice.

 

Copyright © by Portico Advisers, LLC 2017, all rights reserved. 

More Dickensian by the Day

Greetings from Jakarta, home to 30 million people (metro) and half as many cars, judging by traffic. I’m nearly halfway through a circuit of Southeast Asia, where I’ve been meeting with some great managers and discussing the evolution of the region’s private markets landscape.

Over the last five years, LPs have consistently ranked Southeast Asia as one of the top two most-attractive markets for GP investment. Yet this year’s Global LP Survey from EMPEA highlights the perennial disconnect:

  • 41% of respondents plan to begin or expand their commitments to Southeast Asia over the next two years;
  • However, 32% say a limited number of established fund managers deters them from investing in the region (the highest percentage of any EM region); and,
  • 25% say the scale of the opportunity to invest is too small (also the highest percentage across all EMs).

We share a few our of key takeaways from EMPEA’s survey below, but the fundraising environment is becoming more Dickensian by the day.

In any event, I’m off for a weekend in Siem Reap to admire what Norman Lewis described as “probably the most spectacular man-made remains in the world.” Then, I’ll be heading to Ho Chi Minh City for AVCJ’s conference. Let me know if you’re in town.

If you’re interested in having Portico produce a report on the private markets landscape in Southeast Asia, then please drop me a line.

Best wishes,
Mike

A Grim LP Survey

Some depressing reading is on offer in EMPEA’s 2017 Global LP Survey. There are a number of interesting nuggets throughout the report, but I came away with three big takeaways:

  • Talk to the hand — The pie of capital earmarked for EM PE is shrinking. To wit, 25% of LPs plan to decrease the proportion of their PE allocation targeted to EMs over the next two years; this figure jumps to 36% for LPs that have been active in EM PE for more than 15 years.
  • Show me the money — The percentage of LPs expecting at least 16% net from their EM PE portfolios has continuously declined over the last five years: from 61% in 2013 to 43% in 2017. It’s also the first year that this figure dipped below 50%.Though only 17% of respondents expect ≥ 16% net from their developed markets portfolios, I suspect the drivers of these expectations are different: in EMs, it’s a lack of distributions coupled with FX, while in DMs, a surfeit of capital and leverage is fueling frothy entry valuations.
  • Chasing the rabbit — It’s hard not to think LPs are exhibiting some procyclical behavior: India rings in as the most attractive market while Brazil languishes at sixth; health care and consumer goods / services rank as the most attractive sectors.

    ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

A Platinum Lining?

I always make time to read what KKR’s Henry McVey has to say about the markets, and his latest report, The Ultra High Net Worth Investor: Coming of Age, is no exception.

Whereas family offices constituted 6% of the respondent base of EMPEA’s LP Survey (call it 7 or 8 respondents?), KKR surveyed over 50 Ultra High Net Worth clients (defined as investors with ≥ $30m in investable assets and including family offices). The findings should provide a modicum of encouragement to private markets fund managers, as UHNW investors have a tendency to adopt a genuinely long-term perspective, and embrace alternative assets (see charts below).

Money shot: The stock of global HNW assets stands at $60 trillion with a 5-year CAGR of 7.4%, compared to global pension assets of $36.4 trillion and a 5-year CAGR of 5.8%.

KKRUHNW

Ahlan, Bimbo!

The Mexican behemoth Grupo Bimbo has acquired Moroccan baked goods company Groupe Adghal as its toehold in Africa. Three thoughts:

  1. Morocco continues to serve as a popular entrepôt for PEs and corporates to access Sub-Saharan African markets.
  2. Bimbo’s ambitions are truly global. They’ve swallowed up Thomas’ English Muffins, Entenmann’s, Arnold Bread, Sara Lee, and Boboli Pizza north of the border (wall?), and they’re planning to ramp up a growth through acquisition strategy in China.
  3. Personally, my heart warms at the prospect of children around the world sinking their teeth into a sleeve of ¡Sponch! cakes.

Speaking of Hispanophone companies pursuing acquisitions in Africa, there was a super interesting announcement from Helios Investment Partners and the Spanish multinational GBfoods earlier this month. The firms are pursuing a joint venture to create a leading pan-African FMCG franchise. I think we’ll continue to see PE firms teaming with multinationals to de-risk acquisitions and validate their entry into new markets; it’s a compelling proposition.

Out of curiosity, I investigated the number of Hispanophone acquisitions in Africa (excluding our friends at Mediterrania Capital Partners). Across 30 deals since 2008, six have been in metals and mining, and four in F&B. Small volumes, but the trend is up and to the right (see chart below).

May 2017 Hispanophone Exhibits

The Saga Continues

Baring Private Equity Asia and CPPIB announced that they are taking Nord Anglia private for $4.3B. Baring originally took the company private in 2008, led the firm through a $350m IPO in 2014, and a $170m follow-on issuance in 2015. Over the last four years, Nord Anglia executed at least seven acquisitions, according to Thomson Reuters Eikon. The company’s revenues grew from $323.7m in 2013 to $856m in 2016, with net income swinging from a loss of $23.3m to earnings of $47.1 over the period (and posting a 17% ROE in 2016).

Fashionably Late?

Blackstone has decided to join the private debt party in India. Apollo (through a JV with ICICI Ventures), Baring Private Equity Asia, Clearwater Capital, KKR, and Piramal—among others—have been in the mix for some time. It’s a huge market, but one wonders if the bar’s running out of elbow room.

From the Bookshelf

A seed that sprouts at the foot of its parent tree remains stunted until it is transplanted … Every human being, when the time comes, has to depart and seek his fulfillment in his own way.

— R.K. Narayan (trans.), The Ramayana (Penguin: 1987).

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The information presented in this newsletter is for informational purposes only. Portico Advisers does not undertake to update this material and the opinions and conclusions contained herein may change without notice. Portico Advisers does not make any warranty that the information in this newsletter is error-free, omission-free, complete, accurate, or reliable. Nothing contained in this newsletter should be construed as legal, tax, securities, or investment advice.

Copyright © by Portico Advisers, LLC 2017, all rights reserved.